As is the case with other international human rights treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) offers states parties to the convention possibilities to limit the exercise of human rights in times of crisis. The margin of appreciation doctrine employed by the European Court of Human Rights gives states a lot of leeway in applying the Convention domestically. The question is whether the Convention also allows states to restrict rights guaranteed under the Convention to a degree which would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Convention. To answer the question whether human rights are sufficiently guaranteed under the Convention even in times of emergencies we will first look at general rules concerning the restriction of rights under the Convention. We will then move our investigation to Art. 15 ECHR and look at the conditions set by the norm, its limits as well as at some special cases of emergencies.
refers to all humans. Nevertheless the Court has refrained from stating the obvious, namely that abortion is incompatible with Art. 2 of the Convention. If it would be legal, there would have been an exception to this effect already included within the norm, which is not the case. The Court justifies its failure to apply the law according to its wording with the lack of agreement between the member states on this issue. In giving states that much of an opportunity to deviate from the wording of the Convention, the Court has shown that it is at risk of being abused by states at the cost of individual human rights holders. Abortion is incompatible with the wording of Art. 2 (1) ECHR. Yet, most states" parties to the Convention allow abortion in one way or another. But that does not mean that abortion has suddenly become legal despite the wording of Art. 2 (1) ECHR. 6 To the contrary, it means that currently only Malta and Ireland can be considered as fulfilling their obligations under the Convention in this respect. But if the mere divergence of views between different member states de facto prevents the Court from clearly stating the law, it has to be feared that the Court might also be willing to grant states too much freedom to restrict human rights if they claim some kind of emergency and allege that this emergency makes it necessary for them to do so. One step in this 5 Article 2 ECHR reads as follows: "1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not b-e regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection." 6 To answer the question whether human rights are sufficiently guaranteed under the Convention even in times of emergency we will first look at general rules concerning the restriction of rights under the Convention. We will then move our investigation to Art. 15 ECHR and will then look at some special cases.
GENERAL RULES
The term "general" rules might be somewhat misleading, but there are unified rules on how at least some of the rights protected by the Convention can be limited by the states parties to the ECHR. This applies in particular to Articles 8 -11 of the Convention, 7 which contain rules on the limitation of rights in their respective sections 2. 
THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHTS UNDER THE CONVENTION
In order to understand how states can legally limit Convention rights in regular times, one has first to understand the scope of the right in question. 9 The scope of a right under the Convention is affected when a state organ limits or prohibits the exercise of a right. 10 12 Cf. Anne Peters, supra note 7, p. 22. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.
IMPLIED LIMITATIONS
Such implied limitations are somewhat problematic since they affect rights which, according the wording of the Convention, are not subject to explicit
limitations. Yet, since the exercise of one right will often affect the rights of others, some sort of limitation will often be inevitable. At the same time, the idea of a maximum protection of human rights makes it necessary to use this concept sparingly, which explains why the Court has assumed such implied limitations of rights in only a few cases, for example 18 concerning the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR) 19 , the right to marry (Article 12 ECHR), 20 the right to education (Article 2 Protocol 1) 21 as well as the right to vote (Article 3
Protocol 1) 22 and the right to fair trial, in particular the right to access to a court (Article 6 (1) ECHR) 23 -a right which the Court itself has problems dealing with,
given the large number of new applications it deals with and the significant backlog of cases. 24 (It is hoped that the new Protocol 14 which will not only allow for 
Necessary in a democratic society
These cases include measures which are necessary in a democratic society, which means that there has to be a pressing social need for the state to take the action in question which limits rights under the Convention. 34 The severity of the measures must not be disproportionate to the aim of the measure, 35 and, even more, the Court "must determine whether the interference in issue was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient."
36

The Margin of Appreciation
Nevertheless, the Court respects the sovereignty of the states" parties 37 by
granting them a large margin of appreciation concerning both the conditions for limiting European Convention rights. 38 This margin of appreciation is said to be even wider when national interests are at stake which dominate over the interests of an individual. 39 This approach is problematic since human rights law to a large extent developed for the purpose of protecting individuals against the power of the majority.
Enumerated Cases allowing for Limitations of Human Rights
It is particularly important that limitations of human rights outside a state of emergency are only possible in a small number of cases, specifically, in those cases envisaged by section 2 of the relevant norm of the Convention, for example for the protection of national security, the prevention of crime, the protection of the rights of others or of public health. of the Convention. While derogations are general with regard to the subject matter and specific with regard to the circumstances, reservations are specific with regard to the subject matter and may not, by law, be general in nature. 45 Derogations might have been rare, but nevertheless a critical part of the European Human Rights System in that they create an option for states" parties to 
PUBLIC EMERGENCY THREATENING THE LIFE OF THE NATION
The state of emergency for which a derogation can be permissible requires a threat to the life of the nation. This means that the situation has to affect the population as a whole 55 and that it has to constitute a threat to the organized life of the community. 56 The term "life of the nation" in this context does not necessarily mean "existence of the state" or "existence of the people" but is understood much wider, in the sense of the "way of life" which is protected as well.
In Lawless v. Ireland, the Court required for the applicability of Art. 15 (1)
ECHR that there exists "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the State is composed."
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In determining whether such a state of emergency which threatens the life of the nation, 58 states enjoy a wide but not unlimited margin of appreciation because, in line with the idea of subsidiarity, the national authorities are thought to be closer to the reality on the ground and therefore better able to determine whether an emergency exists and how to deal with them than international judges in Strasbourg. 59 The question whether the state has exceeded the limits of the margin of appreciation is to be examined as part of the question whether the derogation has been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 60 It is up to the states" parties to the Convention, which are responsible for the life of the nation, 61 "to determine whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency." In its investigation the Court will not only look at the measure as such but also at its intensity, which is why it adjudicated in favor of the claimant in Aksoy v.
Turkey 69 based on the fact that it considered the 30-day detention period at stake in that case 70 to be longer than necessary. 71 What makes the Court"s work in this regard effective is the Court"s holistic approach to the issue, taking into account the entire situation, including "the safeguards which the State puts in place to compensate for suspension of the rights required by the Convention provision in respect of which the derogation is filed," 72 i.e. the protection of individuals affected by the special measures 73 
NOTIFICATION
The state which claims a derogation has to inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the reasons for the derogation as well as of the measures which have been taken in this context. 84 Despite the lack of expressed sanctions, 85 this notification requirement is constitutive for the legality of the derogation. 86 Art.
15 (3) ECHR includes the obligation on the part of the state to name the laws in question 87 and to provide the Secretary General of the Council of Europe with the relevant legal texts. 88 For example, in the derogation leading up to the Lawless Case, the Irish government provided the Secretary General of the Council of Europe not only with the proclamation of the derogation but also with the relevant codified laws. 89 On the other hand, the Court held in Aksoy v. Turkey 90 that the Turkish notification lacks the necessary degree of specification in that it did not name the measures which had been taken under the derogation. 91 The notification does not have to be immediate. Rather, as the Court called it in Lawless, 92 it has to be "without delay". 93 The Court has been very generous in allowing states a certain degree of flexibility in this regard, allowing for a twelve day interval between the adoption of measures under national law and the subsequent notification 94 in Lawless v. Ireland 95 and even four months 96 in the Greek case, 97 (although it has to be noted that there were special circumstances ] that communication without delay is an element in the sufficiency of information required by" 100 Article 15 (3) ECHR.
DOMESTIC PROCLAMATION
It is important to note that there is no requirement on the part of the state to publicly announce the derogation domestically. 101 This obligation of the state is towards the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, not towards the citizens.
While compatible with the clear wording of the Convention, such a narrow interpretation is unfortunate in that it can limit the effectiveness of the Convention.
In fact the lack of an obligation to publicize derogations undermines the rule of law, which Article 15 is supposed to safeguard in the long run, by allowing states to take extraordinary measures for the purpose of protecting the functioning of the state in the long term, in that it allows situations in which potential applicants cannot know the legal situation including the rights they can claim in Strasbourg.
Brannigan and McBride
102 has been interpreted by some authors to require some form of official promulgation of the derogation, 103 but there is "no direct authority on this issue". 104 Nevertheless, due to the Court"s holistic approach it is not too far-fetched to assume that "a [s]tate which had not made any formal announcements within the legal order might find itself facing greater difficulty in proving the existence of a public emergency before the Court." 105 http://www.ena.lu/resolution_dh_70_committee_ministers_council_europe_15_april_1970-020005255.html (accessed May 28, 2010). 98 After the coup, Greece would eventually leave the Council of Europe only to return again later. In so far and as it has been proven by the fact that the Eastern European states quickly joined the Council after the end of the Cold War, membership in the Council has become a yardstick for measuring the development of European states and even the Vatican, although not a member, participates indirectly in that the Holy See has observer status at the CoE. Currently this leaves Belarus and Kazahkstan the odd ones out (see already footnote 3). The yardstick role of the ECHR for EU candidate countries might also explain the continued interest in forging a closer connection between the EU and the COE despite the emergence of a specific EU human rights regime. 
SPECIAL CASES
As the first decade of the new century is characterized by a general sense of crisis, 108 including fears of global terrorism, diseases and most recently economic crisis, some special cases deserve particular attention since they are more likely to prompt states to derogate from their international human rights obligations:
TERRORISM
The purpose of Article 15 ECHR is to guarantee the rule of law in the long term -while imposing some limitations on states on how to achieve this goal. The way the norm has been phrased, placing threats to the life of the nation in the context of war, makes it easy to think that only violence-related threats to 
PUBLIC HEALTH
In recent years, several highly publicized health threats such as mad cow disease and its human variant, Creutzfeld-Jacob, the avian flu or more recently the swine flu have lead states to take measures aimed at reducing the risk associated with such diseases. For example, it is conceivable that the risks posed to public health by a particularly risky behavior or a transmittable disease can amount to a situation which threatens the life of the nation and which requires special measures which would run afoul of the Convention, would the state not derogate from it. In fact, the states have an obligation to take the necessary measures to protect the population against such risks because the states" duty to protect inherent in the Convention also applies to public health. If the situation is of sufficient gravity and no ordinary means are available which would produce the desired result, the state might even be obliged to derogate from the Convention for the sake of protecting the life of the nation. The omission on the part of states to take extraordinary measures in this respect might in itself become problematic under the Convention.
CONCLUSIONS
Any derogation includes the risk of abuse. Nevertheless, the ECHR grants states" parties a rather wide margin of appreciation in determining whether there is a situation which amounts to an emergency within the meaning of Art. 15 ECHR as well as concerning the response which the state in question deems necessary to deal effectively with the situation. At the same time, we can conclude that the Convention also contains a corrective in that it requires that the measures taken by the state to deal with the emergency have to pass a test of necessity and the holistic approach shown by the Court has so far served well to strike a balance between giving states the freedom to take the necessary measures and protecting human rights. As the Human Rights Committee has already held with regard to the ICCPR"s derogation clause, states which derogate their international human rights obligations have to strive first and foremost to restore the normal status in which the international human rights instrument in question can be fully applied again.
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It has to be kept in mind, though, that these findings are based on the relative stability in the states" parties to the Convention. At the time of writing, the global financial crisis had affected some states severely to the point that governments fell but without too severe effects on the states as such and the basic premise of relative stability remains intact. Of course, there is no guarantee that this will continue to be the case. 
